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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS - FEDERAL COURT
REVIEW OF STATE STATUTES - ABSTENTION The United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the Younger
abstention doctrine does not bar a federal court from entertaining
a civil rights action seeking injunctive relief against an ongoing state
quiet title action since the state had not initiated the underlying
state proceeding.
Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1978).
On October 21, 1975, Doris E. Johnson, Joseph Massey and Joseph and Mary Tunstall filed a proposed class action suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.' The basis of the action was section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 The plaintiffs3 were former owners
of residential property located in Delaware County, Pennsylvania,
whose property had been sold at a County Treasurer's tax sale' for
the alleged nonpayment of local property taxes. 5 Named as defen1. Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any state or territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Although the suit was brought in a single complaint, it involved three separate controversies concerning three separate properties. See notes 5 & 9 infra.
4. The sale was conducted pursuant to the Pennsylvania County Return Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5971 a - t (Purdon 1968). Section 5971g requires that the record owners of
the property be notified prior to the date of sale by either certified or registered mail, as well
as by newspaper publication. Further, the failure of the property owner to receive personal
notice of the sale does not serve to prejudice the title acquired by the tax sale purchaser as
long as the notice was properly sent.
In 1974, the authority of counties of the second class A, such as Delaware County, to collect
their taxes pursuant to the County Return Act was withdrawn by the Act of July 3, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 451 § 1, as amended by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.102 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
As of January 1, 1976, this amendment required Delaware County to collect taxes pursuant
only to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.101-703. Neither statute contains the notice and hearing
procedures which the plaintiffs claimed were required by due process. See 436 F. Supp. at
165 n.22.
5. Each of the named plaintiffs presented unique factual reasons for nonpayment of the
taxes. See 436 F. Supp. at 159. The common assertion of all the plaintiffs was lack of notice
as to the impending tax sale.
Notice of the tax sale was sent to the trustee of Johnson's property, who in turn forwarded
the notice to Johnson by registered mail. After the sale, notice of Johnson's right to redeem
the properties within two years, as provided by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5971o (Purdon 1968),
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dants were Grace Building Company, Inc. and Curtis Building Co.,
Inc., the tax sale purchasers of the properties in question, as well
as Robert F. Kelly, Prothonotary of the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas.' The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment
stating that the tax sales held pursuant to the County Reform Act 7
violated due process in that the County Return Act neither required
personal notification prior to the sales nor a judicial determination
that the taxes were in fact delinquent.8 Further, plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief to prevent tax sale purchasers from commencing
or proceeding with state court actions to quiet title to properties
acquired as these tax sales,' as well as to restrain defendant Kelly
from filing quiet title actions in his official capacity as Prothonotary
of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.'0
The district court concluded that in deference to the principles of
was again mailed to the trustee. The trustee forwarded this notice by registered mail to both
Johnson and her attorney. 436 F. Supp. at 159. The Tunstalls were notified of the sale by
certified mail, and the return receipt bore the signature of Mrs. Tunstall. After the sale, they
too were informed of redemption rights by registered mail. Id. at 160. The Masseys were twice
notified by certified mail of the impending sale. The first return receipt bore the signature of
a daughter, and the second the signature of Mrs. Massey. Again, notice of redemption rights
was mailed to the same address. Id. at 161. In each instance, the plaintiffs either denied
receipt, had no recollection of it, or disputed the authenticity of the signatures.
6. Id. at 158.
7. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
8. 436 F. Supp. at 157.
9. It was the contention of the plaintiffs that they first learned of the tax deficiencies upon
notification of the quiet title actions instituted in state courts by Grace and Curtis. Despite
personal service upon Johnson, she neither filed an answer nor in any way defended the quiet
title action, thereby suffering a final judgment by default. Id. at 159. Service was made upon
the Tunstalls in the quiet title action by leaving a copy of the complaint at their residence
with their adult daughter. The Tunstalls likewise did not defend the action and also suffered
a final judgment by default. Id. at 160. The trial in the quiet title action against Massey had
not yet commenced when the federal suit was filed, and was being held in abeyance. Id. at
161.
Johnson's attorney did not learn that his client had suffered a default judgment until after
the federal complaint was filed. He then filed a petition to have the default judgment opened
in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 159. The Tunstalls, in March of 1972,
petitioned the Delaware County Court to reopen the default judgment against them, which
the court granted. Id. at 160. A subsequent favorable trial verdict was reversed and remanded
in Curtis Bldg. Co. v. Tunstall, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 81, 343 A.2d 389 (1975)(testimony that
notice not received insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity). Thus, when the
federal complaint was filed, quiet title actions against all three named plaintiffs were pending
in state courts.
10. Defendant Kelly became a Judge of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas
during the course of the federal action. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1), E. Jack Ippoliti,
the new Prothonotary, was substituted for Kelly. 436 F. Supp. at 167 n.30.
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Younger v. Harris" and its progeny, it was constrained from reaching the merits and thus dismissed the complaint. 2 In arriving at this
conclusion, the district court reviewed two judicially created abstention doctrines. First, the court held that Pullman3 abstention
was inapplicable as its purpose is to avoid needless adjudication of
constitutional issues. Since, according to the district court, the
County Return Act clearly did not provide for the two procedures
which the plaintiffs argued were required by due process, there was
no possibility of a state court construing the statute in a manner
which would preclude the need to address the constitutional issues. I
The second judicially created abstention doctrine, Younger abstention,'5 is based on notions of equity, comity and federalism. 6 Although the district court conceded that the Younger doctrine has
not been held to apply to all civil litigation, it nonetheless insisted
that the decision of the Supreme Court in Trainor v. Hernandez'7
indicated that the linchpin of Younger abstention is simply the
11. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts forbidden to stay or enjoin pending state criminal
prosecutions).
12. 436 F. Supp. at 158.
13. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman abstention, federal
jurisdiction is retained while the parties submit their claims to the state courts. After the
relevant state statutes are construed, the federal court can then hear the constitutional claims
if necessary. Id. at 501. See also note 18 infra.
14. 436 F. Supp. at 162.
15. 401 U.S. 37. This doctrine actually evolved from six cases decided the same day as
Younger. The other five cases are Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971)
(no showing of irreparable injury sufficient to justify federal intervention when the federal
plaintiff had not been threatened with prosecution); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971)
(Younger principles apply when federal court asked to issue declaratory judgment).
16. The equitable restraint component of Younger follows the traditional equity maxim
that courts of equity should not act when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law
and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. 401 U.S. at 43. Among its
purposes is to avoid duplication of legal proceedings where a single suit would be adequate
to protect the rights asserted. Id.
The policy of equitable restraint is reinforced by an even more vital consideration-the
notion of "comity"-which is a peculiar outgrowth of a federal system. Comity and federalism
are synonymously defined as:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country
is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief
that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Id. at 44.
17. 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (federal court must abstain from interfering with an ongoing state
civil enforcement proceeding).
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pendency of a state proceeding."8 The district court stated that abstention was appropriate if the state's underlying interest in the
pending action was likely to be as great as it would be in a criminal
proceeding." Although the pending action in Johnson involved disputes between purely private parties, the court concluded that the
state's interest in vindicating the validity of its official actions in
conducting tax sales was nevertheless sufficient to warrant abstention. 20
Plaintiffs Johnson and Massey,2 on behalf of themselves and the
class they sought to represent, appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit which vacated the order of the
district court. 22 Chief Judge Seitz, speaking for the court, held that
outside the context of a challenge to civil contempt proceedings, the
Younger doctrine should not be extended to cases in which the state
proceedings have not been initiated by the state itself.2 3 Moreover,
Seitz stated that in reaching its decision the district court had improperly interpreted the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in Trainorv. Hernandez. The predominant feature in Trainor,
as expressed in the plurality and concurring opinions, was the fact
that the state had instituted the civil enforcement proceedings
sought to be enjoined. 2 Since the jurisdictional limitation of the
Federal Anti-Injunction Act 25 is inapplicable to cases brought pur18. 436 F. Supp. at 162. In contrast to Pullman, which requires a federal court to retain
jurisdiction pending the state court resolution, Younger mandates outright dismissal of the
federal action.
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id. at 165.
21. Although the Tunstalls presumably remained members of the proposed class the state
quiet title action against them proceeded after the district court's dismissal and resulted in
an adverse verdict. See Curtis Bldg. Co. v. Tunstall, 387 A.2d 1370 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978)
(notice provisions of the County Return Act satisy due process; methods exist whereby the
alleged tax delinquency can be challenged). The Tunstalls' petition for allocatur to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was pending when the Third Circuit announced its opinion.
Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242, 1244 n.1 (3d Cir. 1978). The Tunstalls had previously been
through the state court system on the same matter. See note 9 supra.
22. Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1978).
23. Id. at 1249. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (federal court must abstain from
interfering with ongoing state civil contempt proceeding).
24. 583 F.2d at 1249. In Trainor,Justice White wrote the plurality opinion, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Stevens dissented.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Act provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
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suant to section 1983,6 and Younger abstention was inappropriate,
Seitz concluded that the district court had jurisdiction which it was
required to exercise.Chief Judge Seitz then reasoned that the extension of Younger
principles to all civil litigation, coupled with the Supreme Court's
definition of "pending state litigation" in Hicks v. Miranda,"'would
impose upon the section 1983 plaintiff a requirement of exhausting
state judicial remedies. This, he postulated, would undermine the
holding of Monroe v. Pape," in which the Supreme Court held state
judicial exhaustion is not required of a section 1983 plaintiff. Such
a requirement would be inconsistent with his understanding of
0 concerning Younger's relationship to secHuffman v. Pursue, Ltd.3
3
tion 1983 claims. '
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
26. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), § 1983 actions for injunctive relief were
held to be within the "expressly authorized by Act of Congress" exception to the prohibitions
of § 2283. See note 25 supra. Younger was decided one year prior to Mitchum and had left
open the possibility that in certain limited circumstances federal injunctive relief might be
proper. These circumstances were great and irreparable harm to the federal plaintiff, the
presence of a state law that was flagrantly or patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions, or evidence that the prosecution was brought in bad faith. 401 U.S. at 53.
In Mitchum, the district court held that § 2283 left it without power to act upon a § 1983
claim, if a state proceeding was then pending. The Supreme Court recognized that to affirm
the district court would require that Younger be overruled, for if § 2283 were an absolute bar,
then federal injunctive relief would not be proper even under the extreme circumstances
specified in Younger. See 407 U.S. at 231. In finding § 1983 to be an "expressly authorized"
exception to § 2283, the Court employed three criteria. First, the federal law need not expressly refer to § 2283 to qualify as an "expressly authorized" exception. Second, the federal
law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify
as the exception. Third, in order to qualify as an "expressly authorized" exception to § 2283,
the federal law must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy which could
be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding. 407 U.S. at 237-38.
Having determined that § 1983 met the above criteria, the Court indicated that Younger
considerations would temper the use of federal injunctive power. Id. at 243.
27. 583 F.2d at 1250.
28. 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (where state criminal proceedings are begun against the
federal plaintiff after the federal complaint is filed, but before any proceedings of substance
on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger apply in full
force).
29. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). For discussion reaching a contrary conclusion, see notes 90-92 and
accompanying text infra.
30. 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (federal court must abstain from interfering with ongoing civil
nuisance proceeding).
31. 583 F.2d at 1250 (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 n.21 (1975)). See
note 90 infra.
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Despite its rejection of a state interest test for civil abstention, the
court found that if that were to be a factor, the state's interest in
quiet title actions between private litigants is minimal.3 2 The interest of the state in the outcome of quiet title actions is not appreciably greater than its interest in any other private lawsuit in which
3
state legislation is challenged on federal constitutional grounds. 1
Seitz thus reasoned that to dismiss a federal complaint in the face
of such a lessened state interest was fundamentally inconsistent
with the Congressional decision to create in section 1983 a federal
forum for the adjudication of constitutional claims of the type presented by Johnson v. Kelly. Seitz concluded by relying-upon the
Supreme Court's admonition that abstention is an extraordinary
and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it, and therefore held that the court
erred in extending the Younger doctrine.
Judge Aldisert dissented,35 and in the process proffered a conceptual framework for the application of Younger abstention in a civil
context. His analysis began with the premise that federal courts are
required by Younger to withhold their power to enjoin state criminal
proceedings. The only exception to this principle emerges when the
federal plaintiff demonstrates the extraordinary circumstances that
the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate and cannot be eliminated by his defense in a single state proceeding. In
Aldisert's view, this exception to the Younger rule should form the
basis of the test in civil cases as well." He maintained that when
the federal protection asserted by a federal plaintiff can be interposed by him as an effective defense in a state civil proceeding, a
federal court should withhold its power to enjoin the state proceed37

ing.

32. 583 F.2d at 1251. The relief sought by the federal plaintiffs, in the event the County
Return Act was found to be constitutionally deficient, was an extension of the two-year
redemption period allowed by state law. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5971o (Purdon 1968).
The court stated that the effect such an extension would have upon the willingness of future
purchasers to buy at tax sales was mere speculation, since purchasers were already faced with
the potential exercise of redemption rights. Also, the court noted that Delaware County was
no longer conducting tax sales pursuant to the County Return Act. 583 F.2d at 1251. But cf.
note 4 supra (neither the past nor the present taxing statute contains the notice and hearing
procedures which the federal plaintiffs claim are required by due process).
33. 583 F.2d at 1251-52.
34. Id. at 1252 (citations omitted).
35. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id. Implicit in this statement is a different reading of the significance of Monroe V.
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Aldisert noted that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Mitchum v. Foster,"' the legislative authority for a federal court to
enjoin a state court proceeding was never addressed. The exercise
of federal injunctive power, until Mitchum, was contrary to the
express prohibition contained within the Federal Anti-Injunction
Act. The source for both creating this exception to the Congressional
mandate in the Anti-Injunction Act, and then restricting its application in Younger, was raw judicial power. 3 Only after the judicial
power was exercised, then restrained, did Mitchum explain its
source. Since Mitchum represents the only principled statement of
how this judicial power is derived from section 1983 as an "expressly
authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,4 Aldisert stated
that Mitchum is as important as Younger, for it is Mitchum that
determines federal subject matter jurisdiction in state court injunction cases." Although Mitchum declared that section 1983 was an
"expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the
Mitchum Court was careful to qualify the application of section
1983 as an exception by expressly reaffirming that the Younger principles of equity, comity, and federalism would restrain the exercise
Pape than that adopted by the majority. Aldisert did not view Monroe as authorizing the
conversion of a federal defense in a state court to a federal cause of action in a federal court.
38. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). For a detailed discussion of Mitchum, see note 26 and accompanying text supra.
39. 583 F.2d at 1253 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
recognized the authority of federal courts to enjoin state officers from instituting a state
proceeding to enforce statutes found to be in violation of the federal constitution. This federal
power to enjoin commencement of state proceedings made no distinction between criminal
and civil proceedings. Id. Aldisert contended that this judicially created exception reached
its zenith in Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Court held federal
injunctive relief to be permissible when the federal plaintiff alleged a threat of irreparable
loss of his federally protected rights.
In Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148 (1898), one of the few early cases to apply the
predecessor of the current Anti-Injunction Act, the Court construed the Act as forbidding
injunctions not only against state courts, but also against state officials who were litigating
the pending state court proceeding. Neither Young nor Dombroski deviate from that principle. Rather, they treat the threat of unwarranted prosecutions as being akin to a trespass,
and the prohibitions of the Anti-Injunction Act do not bar the prevention of this "trepass"
so long as actual proceedings in the state court have not begun. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 966 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
40. See note 26 supra. Aldisert refers critically to "the Supreme Court's unabashed love
affair" with § 1983 in Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of FederalJurisdiction:A FederalJudge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the FederalCaseload, 1973 ARiz. ST. L.J. 557, 563.
41. 583 F.2d at 1254 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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of federal injunctive powers.4" Therefore, Aldisert saw no barrier to
applying Younger principles to civil cases, especially since Mitchum
itself was a civil case.' 3
Aldisert next maintained that the most vital consideration behind
the Younger doctrine, that of comity, or the proper respect for state
court functions, is equally as pertinent in a civil context as it is in
45
the criminal context." He observed that even Ex Parte Young,

which sanctioned the use of the fourteenth amendment to halt, as
well as defend against, unlawful state action, explicitly stated that
a federal court could not interfere where the proceedings were already pending in a state court."
Judge Aldisert also questioned the majority's dispositive reliance
upon Trainor, particularly its reliance upon Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, since Blackmun neither discussed the limitations on federal intervention set forth in Mitchum, nor responded
to Justice Stevens' observations." 7 In Trainor, Stevens maintained
in dissent that when the state is a party to the pending proceedings,
a point of controlling significance to Chief Judge Seitz, it should be
less objectionable to have the constitutional issue adjudicated in a
federal forum then if only private litigants are involved. Stevens
believed it to be untenable that abstention is proper only if the state
is a party, unless federalism requires greater deference to a state's
own prosecutorial interest than to its interest in providing a forum
4
for others in the community. "
Contrary to the majority, Aldisert reasoned that the approach
taken by Justice Stevens in Trainor should form the centerpiece of
a civil abstention doctrine." Stevens had dissented because the
state procedure did not afford a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy
42. 407 U.S. at 243. The Court stated that "we do not question or qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to
enjoin a state court proceeding." See also note 26 supra.
43. 583 F.2d at 1255. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). In Mitchum, the prosecuting attorney of
Bay County, Florida, initiated a proceeding in a Florida state court to close down a bookstore
as a public nuisance under Florida law. 407 U.S. at 227. Mitchum was a civil proceeding in
the same sense that Huffman was a civil proceeding. Insofar as the state was a party in
Mitchum, it is distinguishable from Johnson.
44. 583 F.2d at 1256 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
45. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
46. 583 F.2d at 1256 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. 431 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
49. 583 F.2d at 1257 n,7 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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for the plaintiffs' federal claim.50 Based upon Stevens' approach,
Aldisert considered the availability of a state forum in which a
federal plaintiff could assert his federal defense to be the key factor
of a civil abstention doctrine.5 ' While ostensibly rejecting Justice
Blackmun's pronounced state interest test articulated in Trainor,
Aldisert insisted that even if the test were so conceptualized, the
state has a pronounced interest in maintaining the viability and
integrity of its own court system.5 2
Judge Aldisert concluded with the historical note that at no time
before or after Mitchum had the Supreme Court permitted federal
courts to enjoin state civil proceedings solely on the strength of
section 1983 subject matter jurisdiction. In order for a federal court
to intervene with an ongoing state proceeding, the Supreme Court
has always insisted that the federal plaintiff prove that exceptional
53
circumstances are present whch warrant federal intervention.
At its inception, the Younger doctrine was a federal policy
whereby federal courts declined to exercise jurisdiction when requested to enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding.5 4 The
Younger Court explicitly stated that only by the exercise of a judicial exception to the Anti-Injunction Act could federal courts lay
claim to the power to enjoin a state proceeding. 5 This judicial exception, which the Court acknowledged, would not be invoked absent a showing of absolute necessity, which required proof of irreparable injury that was both great and immediate. Although recognizing the availability of a federal injunctive power in extraordinary
circumstances, the Court clearly indicated that when federal courts
are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts they normally should refrain from issuing the injunction.57 Mitchum v.
Foster reaffirmed the availability of a federal power to enjoin state
proceedings, but significantly did so on the basis that the source of
the power was legislative in nature, in that section 1983 was held to
58
be an "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
50. 431 U.S. at
51. 583 F.2d at
52. 583 F.2d at
53. Id. at 1258.
54. 401 U.S. 37
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id. at 45.
57. Id.
58. 407 U.S. at

470 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1257 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See note 79 and acompanying text infra.
1257 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
(1971). See notes 11 & 15 supra.

243. See also note 26 supra.
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However, the power to enjoin was to be exercised only in the extreme
circumstances specified in Younger. 5
Since Younger, federal courts have been required to withhold
their injunctive powers in non-criminal state proceedings as a result
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,"'
Juidice v. Vail,6 and Trainorv. Hernandez.2 In Huffman, the court
noted that the matter before them was more akin to a criminal
matter than a civil proceeding, yet stated that the comity and federalism aspect of Younger applied to a civil proceeding in much the
same manner as it does to a criminal proceeding. 3 Thus, Younger
abstention was held to be appropriate when the state sought to
enforce a public nuisance statute. 4
In holding that Younger abstention was appropriate even if the
state statute in question could not be deemed criminal or quasicriminal in nature, 5 Juidice further extended the doctrine into the
civil area. Under the statutory scheme at issue in Juidice, a judgment debtor who failed to appear at a deposition to give information
relevant to satisfaction of the judgment could be held in contempt
of court. 6 The fine imposed upon the debtor was payable to the
creditor who had brought the action. 7 In no way was the state a
party in Juidice other than to provide a forum for private parties
engaged in a monetary dispute. The Juidice Court stated that the
more vital consideration behind the Younger doctrine is comity,""
which is implicated by federal interference that reflects negatively
upon the state courts' ability to adjudicate federal constitutional
principles. 9 Abstention was thus proper in the context of a challenge to the state civil contempt proceedings, since the vindication
of state judicial authority was at stake.70
In Trainor, the state brought a civil action in state court seeking
a return of welfare payments alleged to have been wrongfully re59. Id. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
60.
61.
62.

420 U.S. 592 (1975). See note 30 supra.
430 U.S. 327 (1977). See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
431 U.S. 434 (1977). See note 17 supra.

63. 420 U.S. at 604.
.64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 334. For the definition of comity, see note 16 supra.
Id. at 336. See also note 95 and accompanying text infra.
Id. at 335.
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ceived. Pursuant to state law, a writ of attachment was executed
against the property of the federal plaintiffs without notice or hearing.7' A divided Court held that Younger applied to an ongoing
civil enforcement proceeding brought by the state so long as the
constitutional challenge to the state's attachment
statute could be
2
raised as a defense in the state proceeding.
In the three principle Supreme Court decisions concerning the
application of Younger in a civil context, the court has explicitly
deferred ruling on the extent to which the abstention doctrine applies in civil proceedings, thereby leaving its development to the
lower federal courts.73 By taking the position that it did in Johnson,
the Third Circuit has refused to extend Younger any further than
absolutely required by these Supreme Court precedents. Such a
narrow reading of those cases seems unwarranted, for in each instance that the Supreme Court extended the Younger doctrine, it
rejected a mechanical application by the lower federal courts of its
previous decisions, conducting instead a searching analysis of the
need for federal intervention under the specific facts of the case.74
The majority also failed to draw an adequate factual distinction
between Juidice and Johnson. In Juidice, the state was not a party
71. 431 U.S. 434, 436 (1977).
72. Id. at 446.
73. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 n.8 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 336 n.13 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975).
For examples of the application of Younger to pending state civil proceedings, see Duke v.
Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974) (invocation of
jurisdiction of federal district court after state trial court had entered its order was no more
than the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a federal court vested only with original jurisdiction); Lynch v. Snepp. 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Cousins
v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice,
1972) (plausible claim of constitutional infringement insufficient to enjoin state proceedings).
For cases applying Younger to disputes between private parties, see cases cited in Johnson
v. Kelly, 436 F. Supp. 155, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
74. The development of the state interest test follows a pattern of admitting that the
state's interest is not as great in the case under consideration as it was in previous precedents,
yet is significant enough to warrant abstention. In Huffman, the state's interest in its criminal
justice system was not present as in Younger, yet "an offense to the State's interest in the
nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal
proceeding." 420 U.S. at 604. In Juidice, the state's interest in its contempt process was "not
quite as important as is the State's interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws, Younger,
or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding such as was
involved in Huffman . . . . But we think it is of sufficiently great import as to require
application of the principles of those cases." 430 U.S. at 335. Accord, Trainor v. Hernandez,
431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977).
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to the proceedings enjoined by the district court. 5 In an effort to
show that the state was a party in Juidice, the Johnson majority
merely stated that by exercising his power of civil contempt, a state
court judge becomes a real party to the proceedings in a unique
way."6 Moreover, the Johnson court maintained that an injunction
against the exercise of a state judge's contempt power implicates the
comity strand of Younger to a far greater extent that does an injunction preventing private litigants from pursuing quiet title actions in
state court." The court failed to explain, however, why a challenge
to a single judicial power, albeit an important one, implicates the
comity strand of Younger to a greater degree than does a challenge
to the entire judicial function of a state court. The holding of Juidice
was dictated by respect for the judicial function, not the importance
of the challenged judicial power. This is illustrated by the manner
in which the Juidice Court phrased the issue, which questioned
whether it was proper to entertain the federal plaintiff's 1983 action
when the state provided an available forum to raise constitutional
issues." In answering that it was not proper, the Juidice Court
stated that to invoke Younger abstention no more was required than
the opportunity to present federal claims in a state proceeding."
The Johnson decision curiously ignored this factor, since not only
could the federal plaintiffs have raised the defense in state court;
one had already done so. 0
Thus, while Juidice indicates that the state need not be a party
in the pending proceeding for Younger abstention to apply, the
Johnson court relied upon Trainor as establishing that abstention
is proper only when the state is a party. The district court in Trainor
75. 430 U.S. at 330. See text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
76. 583 F.2d at 1249.
77. Id.
78. 430 U.S. at 330.
79. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original). The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, in
which the quiet title actions were pending, specifically allowed the Tunstalls to amend their
complaint to place at issue the constitutionality of the notice provisions of the County Return
Act. Each of the Tunstalls due process arguments was addressed by a state appellate court.
See note 21 supra.The due process arguments raised by the Tunstalls in the state courts were
identical with those raised in the federal action by the proposed class. Compare Curtis Bldg.
Co. v. Tunstall, 387 A.2d 1370, 1371-72 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) with Johnson v. Kelly, 583
F.2d 1242, 1245 (3d Cir. 1978). There can be no serious contention that the state courts would
not or did not provide a forum in a timely fashion to hear the constitutional arguments.
80. The Johnson Court noted without comment the status of the Tunstalls' case in the
Pennsylvania courts. 583 F.2d at 1244 n.1. See also note 79 and accompanying text supra.
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had discounted the importance of the state's presence in the suit as
mere happenstance, since the challenged state Attachment Act allowed a private cause of action as well.8 ' Justice White answered this
by stressing the fact that although several options were available,
the state chose a civil enforcement procedure to safeguard its interests, and therefore the statutory scheme was of obvious importance
to the state.8 2 If White perceived abstention to be proper solely
because the state was a party, the remainder of his analysis would
have been unnecessary. White's opinion clearly indicated that it is
the state's interest, and not their presence, which is the paramount
consideration. The state's presence in Trainoronly made their interest more obvious. Justice Blackmun's concurrence followed similar
reasoning, with the primary inquiry focusing on the substantiality
of the state's interest. 3 Thus, Trainor in no way suggested that
notions of comity are disengaged when the state is not a party litigant.
As it did in Juidice, the Trainor Court phrased the issue for decision in a manner that questioned the appropriateness of federal
intervention when the federal plaintiff could tender his federal
claims as a defense in the ongoing state proceedings." Again the
Court concluded that the pendency of the state court proceeding
called for federal restraint, unless extraordinary circumstances were
present warranting federal interference or unless the state did not
provide a forum to litigate federal due process claims.8 The emerging concept behind the Supreme Court cases in this area is that once
the state court has shown a willingness to hear the federal claim, it
should have the opportunity to do so," including apellate review to
correct errors committed by the trial courts.8 7 Resort to the federal
81. 431 U.S. at 439. After finding that the challenged statute authorized private, as well
as public suits, the district court in Trainor mechanically applied Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
concluding that Huffman required abstention only when the challenged statute gave an
exclusive right of action to the state. Id.
82. Id. at 444.
83. Id. at 448. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 440.
85. Id. at 446. It is significant that the Trainor Court did not know if the federal plaintiffs
could raise their federal due process claims in the state courts. Having rejected all other
reasons for federal intervention, the Court ordered the district court on remand to inquire into
the availability of a state forum. Id. at 447. This disposition in Trainorwas a departure from
earlier decisions which held that the federal court must provide relief when the availability
of a state remedy is uncertain. See 431 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977).
87. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). Aside from the negative
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system is to occur only after exhaustion of state review, and then
only by the United States Supreme Court. 8
Perhaps the Johnson majority's most serious flaw is in its statement that Monroe v. Pape would be undermined by an extension
of Younger principles to all civil litigation.8 This, the Johnson court
said, would be inconsistent with the dictates of Huffman concerning
the application of the Younger doctrine to Civil Rights actions? '
However, Monroe simply made available the federal courts to persons whose federal rights had been violated by state officials, with
section 1983 providing subject matter jurisdiction." In Monroe,
there was no state proceeding pending against the federal plaintiff.
The issue was simply whether the federal plaintiff has to initiate his
cause of action in the state courts if state law provided a remedy,
not whether he had to defend an ongoing proceeding." Monroe is not
undermined by Younger for the simple reason that the essential
requisite for Younger abstention, pendency of state court action,
was lacking in Monroe." Thus viewed, Monroe fails to implicate
that aspect of Younger which the Supreme Court has found increasingly distasteful; that is, disrespect for state court functions, 4 the
foremost of which is to adjudicate federal constitutional challenges
inferences upon state appellate courts that the alternative would provide, the fact that federal
courts do not have the same latitude in narrowing state statutes as do state courts is behind
the requirement. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 445 (1977).
88. Where a final decision of a state court has sustained the validity of a state statute
challenged on federal constitutional grounds, an appeal to the United States Supreme Court
is available as a matter or right. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970). See also Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 (1975).
89. 583 F.2d at 1250.
90. Id. (citing 420 U.S. at 609 n.21). The precise quote relied upon by the Johnson court
for this statement reads:
By requiring exhaustion of state appellate remedies for the purposes of applying
Younger, we in no way undermine Monroe v. Pape. . . . There we held that one seeking
redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of federal rights need not first initiate
state proceedings . . . Monroe v. Pape had nothing to do with the problem presently
before us, that of the deference to be accorded state proceedings which have already
been initiated and which afford a competent tribunal for the resolution of federal
issues.
420 U.S. at 609 n.21 (emphasis added). But see note 96 and accompanying text infra.
91. 365 U.S. at 167-68.
92. Id. at 172.
93. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (Younger principles have little force
in the absence of a state proceeding).
94. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977), where Justice White indicated that
the state need not bring the federal plaintiff before it "by force" for Younger to apply.
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to its laws. 5 The Johnson court completely misread Huffman, which
made it clear that Monroe held only that the potential section 1983
plaintiff need not first initiate, as a state plaintiff, a state cause of
action that parallels the federal remedy. 6 That the Supreme Court
does not view a Younger extension to civil actions as undermining
Monroe is further supported by its statement in Huffman that
Monroe had nothing to do with the deference to be accorded state
proceedings already initiated in which a competent tribunal was
afforded for the resolution of federal issues.
In holding that abstention should not apply in civil actions unless
the state is a party to the proceedings, Johnson v. Kelly represents
a philosophy inconsistent with the underlying policy of the Younger
doctrine, which involves a growing respect for the competency of
state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims.9 8 Juidice v.
Vail represents the zenith of this attitude, in that state courts were
asked to pass upon the constitutionality of one of their own powers.99
Johnson, however, allows a party to have a federal court intervene
in a state civil proceeding upon a bare allegation of naked section
1983 subject-matter jurisdiction, with no more than a fourteenth
amendment claim.100 Yet in each section 1983 case the Supreme
Court has decided in which there was a pending state proceeding,
it has required the plaintiff to demonstrate either extraordinary
95. U.S.CONST. art VI, § 2 provides in part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States. . . shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby ....
" See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975), where the
Court expressed the view that the Supreme Court will not assume state judges are unfaithful
in this constitutional obligation.
96. See note 90 and accompanying text supra. The viability of Monroe, even when construed in this manner, is not without doubt. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), a § 1983
plaintiff with a presumptive due process claim was remanded to the state courts to initiate
what the Court considered to be classical cause of action for defamation. Id. at 697. Monroe
was distinguished as stating a valid federal complaint under the fourteenth amendment
because the plaintiff also alleged a violation of a specific constitutional guarantee, the fourth
amendment sanction against unreasonable search and seizure.
97. See note 90 supra.
98. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 336 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
99. 430 U.S. 327 (1977). See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
100. It has been suggested that the very language of § 1983 implicates those aspects of
comity at the core of the Younger doctrine. When utilized to enjoin a pending state court
proceeding, it is an assertion that the state courts have been deficient in guaranteeing constitutional rights, or have actively engaged in the denial of these rights. See Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term - Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 217 (1972).
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circumstances, bad faith of state officials, or lack of an efficient
state remedy as a prerequisite to federal intervention."" Arguably,
this sort of proof is necessary for proper subject matter jurisdiction,
since if the state courts are protecting federal rights, the material
allegation of a 1983 claim is inoperative.'"2 At a minimum, a requirement for such proof also alters the analytical starting point from a
presumption of state court indifference to one of state court sensitivity to federal constitutional claims. The motivating force behind
section 1983's enactment was not incompetence, but indifference, a
distinction wholly lost if a naked 1983 claim is sufficient to enjoin a
3
state court proceeding.1
The essential question raised by Younger is what factors need to
be present for the federal courts to intervene in a purely civil setting.
The Johnson majority's answer was that it is proper to intervene on
all occasions when the state has not initiated the underlying proceeding. 04 Yet of those factors identified in Younger and its progeny
to be sufficient to warrant federal intervention, only one ought to
be of federal concern in a purely private civil action, that being
whether the federal constitutional claim can be raised in the state
court. 05 Bad faith prosecutions or harassment by state officials are
not at issue when one private citizen sues another. The federal challenge in Johnson was not to the conduct of a state plaintiff, but
solely to the constitutionality of a state law."'s The state courts were
asked only to render a dispassionate judgment about procedures
employed in conducting a tax sale. Federal intervention in that
context can reflect nothing but a negative inference upon the competency of state courts. In permitting such intervention, the
101. 583 F.2d at 1258 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a typical review of the circumstances
that warrant federal relief, see Trainor v Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 (1977). See also the
dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting), in which he stated that the assumption that state courts are not as prone
as federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights is especially unwarranted absent a showing
that such is true in the given case. Harlan's view was that a § 1983 claim did not justify federal
intervention if it alleged that state officials were acting badly, but rather only if the state
courts were acting badly could federal intervention be justified. Id.
102. See notes 2 & 101 supra.
103. See generally Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 241-42 (1972).
104. 583 F.2d at 1249.
105. This is the cornerstone of Aldisert's test in Johnson. 583 F.2d at 1257. See text
accompanying note 51 supra. This factor is also absolutely essential before a federal court
can abstain, for the ability to decide correctly assumes a willingness to hear the federal claim.
106. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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Johnson decision not only denigrates efficient jurisprudence,"'7 but
introduces an unnecessary strain upon federal-state relations.1118
Jerry S. McDevitt
107. The Tunstalls had a default judgment removed, two trials, two reviews of these trials
at an appellate level and a petition for allocatur pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
before the Johnson Court rendered its decision. See 583 F.2d at 1244 n.1 and notes 9 & 22
supra. After the Johnson court's decision, the Tunstall's petition for allocatur was denied.
Curtis Bldg. Co. v. Tunstall, 387 A.2d 1370 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978), aflocatur denied, No.
3746 (Nov. 15, 1978). This is a final judgment for purposes of appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970). See HART & WECHSLER, note 39 supra. No appeal
as of right, pursuant to § 1257(2), was taken, nor was a petition for certiorari filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1970).
When the federal complaint is resumed in district court, aside from possible issue preclusion arguments, the court will have to address the class certification issue in light of the
possibility that res judicata bars the Tunstalls from becoming members of the proposed class.
See Huffman V. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18 (1975).
108. In his dissent in Monroe v. Pape, Justice Frankfurter foresaw the potential problems
that section 1983 would create, remarking:
We cannot expect to create an effective means of protection for human liberties by
torturing an 1871 statute to meet the problems of 1960 . . . It is very queer to try to
protect human rights in the middle of the Twentieth Century by a leftover from the
days of General Grant.
365 U.S. 167, 244 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

